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CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TAKINGS CLAUSE IN REGULATORY TAKINGS
Tahoe-SierraPreservationCouncil, Inc. v. Tahoe RegionalPlanning
Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002)
Allison Landgraff
The Respondent' imposed a moratorium2 on development of the
Petitioners' property3 during the process of formulating a comprehensive
land-use plan for the preservation of Lake Tahoe and the Lake Tahoe
Basin.4 Petitioners filed suit,5 alleging that the imposition of the moratoria
constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.' The
district court ruled that the Petitioners were deprived of all economically
viable use of their land and thus, the moratoria amounted to a categorical

* For my parents, Robert and Sheila Landgraff.

1. Respondent was the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1470, 1473 (2002). The Tahoe Regional
Planning Compact created the agency to regulate development and ensure preservation of Lake
Tahoe and the Lake Tahoe Basin. Id. at 1471.
2. The moratoria suspended development on environmentally sensitive land until the
Respondent formulated a regional land-use plan to ensure the preservation of Lake Tahoe. Id. at
1472. The first moratorium, Ordinance 81-5, prohibited any construction or other activity that
would remove vegetation on high hazard land until the regional plan was adopted. Id. at 1472-73.
Delay in the adoption of a sufficient plan led to the imposition of the second moratorium,
Resolution 83-21, which suspended all project reviews and new proposals for eight months. Id.
Together, the two moratoria, in effect, prohibited development on environmentally sensitive land
for thirty-two months. Id.
3. Petitioners were real estate owners in the Lake Tahoe Basin including the lead Petitioner,
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., a non-profit association representing over 2,000 property
owners. Id.
4. Id. at 1471-73.
5. Suit was filed in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002). Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,
Inc., v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1237 (D. Nev. 1999). 42 U.S.C. § 1983
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation... subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law. ...
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002).
6. Tahoe-SierraPres. Council,Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
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taking.7 On appeal,8 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed, reasoning that the moratoria only had a temporary impact on the
fee interest; hence, a categorical taking had not occurred.9 After the U.S.
Court of Appeals denied the petition for rehearing en banc, the U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari.'° The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed and
HELD, that the temporary deprivation of all economically viable use of
land does not amount to a categorical taking requiring just compensation
under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause."1
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause provides a guarantee of just
compensation to a private property owner whose property has been taken
for public use. 2 Traditionally, the Takings Clause applied only to
government condemnation of private property.13 However, in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 4 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that a
government regulation may constitute
a taking ofproperty if the regulation
5
exceeds constitutional limitations.'
In Mahon, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether the Pennsylvania
government exceeded constitutional boundaries when it limited the
Petitioner's right to mine coal underneath the surface of the Respondent's
property. 6 The issue arose after the Pennsylvania legislature passed a

7. Id. at 1245. The U.S. district court for the District of Nevada based its ruling on evidence
of the indefiniteness of the moratoria in that it lacked an express termination date. Id. at 1250-51.
Just compensation was awarded to the Petitioners for the restrictions in Ordinance 81-5 and
Resolution 83-21. Id. at 1245. However, the district court declined to award compensation for the
period after the 1984 Plan was enacted as the Petitioners injury was not caused by the Respondent,
but by the imposition of a court injunction. Id. at 1248.
8. The Petitioners did not challenge the conclusion of the U.S. district court for the District
of Nevada that a taking had not occurred under an ad hoc factual analysis. Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc., v. Tahoe-Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, the sole
issue on appeal was whether there had been a total categorical taking of the Petitioners' property.
9. Id. at 782. The appellate court concluded that the temporary development moratoria did
not deny the Petitioners of all use of their property since the Petitioners were only deprived of the
right to develop for a small fraction of the property's useful life. Id.
10. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1465,
1477 (2002).
11. Id. at 1489.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause reads: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id.
13. E.g., Tahoe-SierraPres. Council,Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1481 n.21.
14. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
15. Id. Justice Holmes concluded that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if the regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id.
16. Id. at 413. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the Respondent's deed conveyed only
surface rights to the property and expressly waived all claims to damages that resulted from the
mining of coal below their property. Id. at 412.
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statute 17 that prohibited methods of mining anthracite coal that would

cause subsidence to the surface property of a homeowner. 8 The analysis
of the Court focused on the facts of the individual case and the extent of
the diminution in property value for the Petitioner. 9 Justice Holmes,
writing for the Court, reasoned that because mining anthracite coal without
causing surface subsidence was commercially impractical, the Petitioner
suffered a substantial decrease in property value.2 ° Most importantly, the
Court noted that the property right to the coal was not meaningful unless
it could be mined from underneath the ground.2 Hence, the Court held that
the statute was not a valid exercise of police power because it destroyed
the property right of the Petitioner to mine anthracite coal.22
After Mahon, the U.S. Supreme Court continued to recognize that in
order for the Takings Clause to have meaning, private property owners
must be compensated when an exercise of police power has overreached
constitutional boundaries.23 However, the extent of the constitutional
limitation on government police power had yet to be clearly defined. The
Court, in the following decades, attempted to define the scope of the
Takings Clause using an ad hoc factual inquiry to analyze each individual
case." In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York, 26 the Court
specifically identified multiple criteria applicable to a case-specific factual
inquiry.2 7 The Court focused on the reasonable investment-backed
expectations of the party, the character of the governmental action, and the
loss of economic value to the party. 28 This three-part balancing test was
used to decide whether the New York City Landmark Preservation Law
that prohibited the Petitioner from further development on its landmark
property constituted a taking.29 The Petitioners 0 filed suit after the city

17. The Kohler Act prohibited the mining of anthracite coal as to cause the subsidence of a
habitable structure, unless the owner of the habitable structure also owned the coal underneath and
was at least 150 feet from another parcel of improved property. Id. at 412-13.
18. Id.
19. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
20. Id. at414.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct.
1465, 1481 (2002).
24. See, e.g., id.
25. Id
26. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 138
30. Petitioner, Penn Central Transportation Company, owned the Grand Central Terminal in
midtown Manhattan. Id. at 115.
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denied permission to build a fifty-story office tower over the landmark
site.3 Despite the value of the existing building belonging to the
Petitioner, the Petitioner argued that the Landmark Preservation Law took
away any profitable use of the air space above the property.32
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the argument ofthe Petitioner that the
deprivation of the airspace use amounted to a taking, stating that the
character of the government action does not amount to a taking unless it
interferes with rights in the parcel as whole.33 Furthermore, the Court
reasoned that the Landmark Preservation Law did not interfere with the
Petitioner's reasonable investment-backed expectations.34 The primary use
of the property was not impeded and the Petitioner was given transferable
rights to build the fifty-story office building in another vicinity.35 The
Court also noted that over four-hundred other properties in New York City
faced similar landmark restrictions, thus the Petitioner was not singled out
to bear a significant financial burden alone. 6 Accordingly, the Court held
that the New York City Landmark Preservation Law did not amount to a
taking of the private property of the Petitioner.37
In Mahon and Penn Central Transportation Co., the U.S. Supreme
Court was reluctant to categorically define when the government had
overstepped constitutional limitations.38 However, in Lucas v. South
Carolina CoastalCouncil,39 the Court emphasized the necessity of a per
se categorical rule when a private property owner has been denied all
economically beneficial or productive use of property.4" In Lucas, the trial
court found that the enactment of a ban on coastal land development"

31. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 117.
32. Id. at 130.
33. Id. at 130-31. The U.S. Supreme Court stated that when determining whether a
governmental action has caused a taking of private property, the deciding court should focus on the
"nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole." Id.
34. Id. at 131 n.27.
35. Id. at 136-37.
36. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 132.
37. Id. at 138.
38. See id. at 124; Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
39. 505 U.S. 1003, 1006 (1992).
40. Id. at 1019; see also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980) (holding that a
land-use regulation violates the Takings Clause when the regulation does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of the land).
41. The Beachfront Management Act prohibited construction of occupiable improvements
on property seaward of the designated baseline. The Beachfront Management Act, S.C. CODE. ANN.
§ 48-39-280(A)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1988). The Act fixed the designated baseline landward of the
property of the Petitioner. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009. Thus, the Petitioner was prohibited from
construction of any occupiable improvements on the property. Id.
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rendered the Petitioner's beachfront property42 valueless.43 On appeal, the
South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that regardless of the economic loss
to the Petitioner, the Petitioner was not entitled to compensation because
there was no vested property right to use one's property to cause a
nuisance." However, the U.S. Supreme Court quickly rejected this
rationale, reasoning that the distinction between mitigating a harmful use
and securing a benefit to the public was minute.45
Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that regulations
prohibiting all economically beneficial use of land can only be sustained
if the restriction was inherent in the original title. 6 The record illustrated
that when the Petitioner purchased the property, there were no restrictions
on development and the surrounding lots already contained single-family
homes.47 Furthermore, the Court noted that the construction of a home was
a generally recognized property right.4" Therefore, the Court ultimately
held that the Petitioner was deprived of all economically beneficial or
productive use of the property, which amounted to a categorical taking.49
On remand, the Petitioner was entitled to compensation unless a principle
of nuisance or property law prohibited the building of single-family homes
on Petitioner's property.5"
In the instant case, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the application of
the categorical rule espoused in Lucas, reasoning that the Petitioner had
only temporarily been deprived of all beneficial uses of the property.5
Instead, the Court affirmed the use of a fact-specific inquiry that focused
on the Penn Central TransportationCo. balancing factors. 2 In reaching
its decision, the Court distinguished the categorical rule applied in Lucas,

42. The Petitioner purchased two residential lots on an island in South Carolina for the
purpose of erecting single-family homes. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006.
43. Id. at 1009.
44. Id. at 1010.
45. Id. at 1026-27. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that implementing the analysis of the
South Carolina Supreme Court would "essentially nullify Mahon's affirmation of limits to the
noncompensable exercise of the police power." Id. at 1027.
46. Id. at 1027.
47. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008.
48. Id. at 1031.
49. Id. at 1030.
50. Id. at 1031.
51. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg' Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1489
(2002). The Penn Central analysis involves an evaluation of several factors including the extent to
which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, the character of
the governmental action, and the regulation's economic effect on the landowner. Id. at 1475.
52. Id. at 1489. The district court found that the evidence did not support a finding that the
Petitioners suffered a taking under a Penn Central TransportationCo. analysis. Id. at 1485. The
Petitioners did not challenge this finding on subsequent appeal. Id.
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as applicable only to the rare case when a property owner has been
deprived of all economic value in the fee interest.5 3 In the instant case,
however, the Court noted that the Petitioners' fee interest, as a whole, was
not rendered valueless because the property recovered value when the
moratoria were lifted. 4 Furthermore, the Court noted that adoption of the
per se rule would have broad ramifications on government police power.55
Specifically, a requirement that the government compensate property
owners for a moratorium on development would lead to an exceptionally
expensive planning process, or force the government to make hasty
decisions. 6
In a strong dissent, Justice Rehnquist warned that the majority's
holding disregarded the constitutional guarantee of just compensation in
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause." Primarily, Justice Rehnquist was
concerned with the majority's conclusion that the temporal aspect of the
moratorium did not require application of the per se rule from Lucas, even
though the Petitioners had been deprived of all economically beneficial use
of their land. 8 Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist noted that the moratoria
imposed by the Respondent went beyond the duration of a normal land-use
planning device. 9 He reasoned that there are implied limitations on title
to property that the Petitioners could have expected; however, the
Petitioners could not have anticipated a thirty-two month moratoria on
property development.6"
By upholding the constitutionality of the Respondent's moratoria on
the Petitioners' property, the U.S. Supreme Court limits the scope of the

53. Id. at 1484.
54. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court speculated that property values in the Lake Tahoe Basin
were actually expected to increase with the adoption of the Lake Tahoe Regional Plan, which
ensured protection of exceptional clarity of Lake Tahoe. Id. at 1489.
55. Id. at 1485.
56. Tahoe-SierraPres. Council,Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1485.
57. Id. at 1490 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist was
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id.
58. Id. at 1492. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 1491. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In particular, Justice Rehnquist noted that the
majority was mistaken to accept the determination of the lower court that Petitioners were deprived
of developing their property for thirty-two months. Id. Instead, he urged that the U.S. Supreme
Court should have found that development was prohibited on the Petitioners' property for six years.
Id. This conclusion was based on the fact that after the moratoria were lifted and the 1984 Plan had
been adopted, an outside suit was brought to challenge the sufficiency of the 1984 Plan. Id. Justice
Rehnquist concluded that the failure of the regional planners to enact a sufficient plan caused the
imposition of the injunction and therefore, caused the Petitioners prohibition on development to
extend to approximately six years. Id.
60. Id. at 1495 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.6 The instant Court narrowed the
applicability of the categorical rule set forth in Lucas, and relied on the use
of the Penn CentralTransportationCo. ad hoc factual analysis to analyze
temporary regulatory takings.62 The ultimate question is whether the
holding of the instant Court creates sound public policy, while adequately
protecting constitutional rights.
The instant Court interprets the Lucas per se rule as applicable only to
the exceptional situation in which a property owner has permanently been
deprived of all economically beneficial uses of the land.63 However, the
instant Court's interpretation of the Lucas rule is questionable considering
that the U.S. Supreme Court in Lucas did not differentiate, as the instant
Court has done, between temporary and permanent deprivations.64 As
Chief Justice Rehnquist points out in his dissent, the only significant
distinction between the development restrictions in Lucas and the
development restrictions in the instant case was the initial label given to
the regulation. 6' Allowing the government to define the regulation as
temporary, while in effect achieving the same result as a supposedly
permanent law, may not effectively protect the constitutional rights of the
private property owner.66
Further, the decision of the instant Court may have overlooked the
policy that first led the U.S. Supreme Court to adopt the Lucas per se
rule. 67 The per se rule was premised on the theory that the effect on
property owners who were denied of all beneficial uses of their property
was equivalent to a government condemnation. 6' By allowing the
Respondents to impose moratoria for a total of thirty-two months, without
compensating the Petitioners, the instant Court allows Respondents to
reach the same result using moratoria as would be prohibited by using
government appropriation. 69 The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause should
61. See Tahoe-SierraPres. Council, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1496 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62. See id. at 1489.
63. Id. at 1483.
64. See id. at 1492 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "It is well established that temporary takings
are as protected by the U.S. Constitution as are permanent ones." Id. (citing First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987)).
65. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226,
1251 (D. Nev. 1999). As stated by the district court, in the instant case, "the indefiniteness of the
ordinances at issue does suggest that this is not the right case in which to hold that temporary
planning moratoria do not always effect takings." Id.
67. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992).
68. Id.
69. See Tahoe-SierraPres. Council, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1493 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In
his dissent, Justice Rehnquist points out that, "the Court allows the government to do by regulation
what it cannot do through eminent domain." Id.
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provide compensation to the Petitioner who, in all fairness and justice, has
made an unfair sacrifice for the well-being of all.7°
Furthermore, the instant Court's reliance on the Penn Central
TransportationCo. balancing factors may not sufficiently define a private
property owner's constitutional rights. In the instant case, regulation of the
Respondent went so far as to deprive the Petitioners of all beneficial use
of their land for at least thirty-two months, yet under the instant Court's
application of the Penn CentralTransportationCo. factors, the Petitioners
were not entitled to compensation.7 Notably, if the Court in Penn Central
TransportationCo. had decided facts similar to the instant case, that Court
likely would have reached a different result.72 In Penn Central
TransportationCo., the Court noted that its holding was limited to the
present record and that if at some point in the future the Grand Central
Terminal lost all economic viability, the Petitioners would have been
entitled to recovery.73
The instant Court's decision to limit the applicability of the Lucas per
se rule was partly based on its desire to create sound public policy.74 While
the instant Court's holding may allow for a lengthier and less expensive
land-use planning process, this arguably may not be a strong enough
justification for limiting the scope of a landowner's constitutional rights.75
Particularly, as a matter of policy, the instant Court resisted applying the
Lucas per se rule to temporary takings in fear that the per se rule would
extend to situations involving normal land-use planning devices including
zoning, permit delays, and variances." However, in Lucas, the Court
carved out an exception to the per se rule for reasonable regulations that
are traditionally recognized as inherent in a property owner's title and
grounded in concepts of property law.77 Such regulations as zoning,
ordinances, and normal delays in the permit process are concepts of
property law that would not trigger application of the per se rule.78 Thus,
70. Id. at 1486. The instant Court noted that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause was
"designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Id. (quoting Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
71. See Tahoe-SierraPres. Council, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1240. "[C]onsideration of the
Penn Centralfactors clearly leads to the conclusion that there was no taking." Id.
72. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978).
73. See id.
74. See Tahoe-SierraPres. Council,Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1487-88.
75. See id. "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way
of paying for the change." Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
76. See Tahoe-SierraPres. Council, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1485.
77. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992).
78. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1494 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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the instant Court could have applied the Lucas rule, with little concern that
the rule would extend to inhibit regular land-use planning.
Alternatively, the instant Court noted that it could have crafted a rule
that specifically defined a time limit on the moratoria, after which the
government must pay the landowner compensation.79 However, this
approach continues to neglect that defining the point at which a regulation
ceases to be temporary would be problematic.8 ° As Justice Holmes warned
in Mahon, the tendency would be to expand the protection given to
government regulation progressively until eventually the constitutional
protection of just compensation would be meaningless."'
In an effort to create sound public policy, the instant Court has
redefined the scope ofthe Fifth Amendment constitutional rights of private
property owners.8 2 The instant Court's holding effectively grants the
government the power to deprive a landowner of all beneficial or
productive uses of the land without compensation for a period of time that
the Court determines is sufficiently temporary. 3 It is arguable whether the
public policy justifications put forth by the Court warranted such an
extensive limit to the constitutional rights of private property owners.8 4

When a regulation merely delays a final land use decision, we have recognized
that there are other background principles of state property law that prevent the
delay from being deemed a taking. We thus noted in First English that our
discussion of temporary takings did not apply in the case of normal delays in
obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like.
Id. (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304,
321 (1987)).
79. See id. at 1484.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
81. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). "When this seemingly absolute
protection is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to
extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappears." Id.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 61-81.
83. Tahoe-SierraPres. Council, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1492 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
84. See id. at 1496 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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